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One important aspect of moral internal-ism, as Lei Zhong (2013) makes clear, turns on the issue of the role of affect in 
motivating moral judgment. This is a complicated 
issue, not only because there are important differ-
ences among types of psychopathy with regard to 
affect, but also because there are important distinc-
tions and connections to be made between affect, 
cognition, moral judgment, and moral action.
Primary and Secondary 
Psychopathy
Zhong considers the difference between devel-
opmental psychopathy and acquired psychopathy. 
As he notes, he defines psychopathy in a broad 
way to include both of these types. Importantly, 
however, he ignores the distinction between pri-
mary, low-anxious psychopathy and secondary, 
high-anxious psychopathy. Koenigs et al. (2011), 
whom Zhong cites, defines the difference in the 
following way:
[I]n some cases psychopathy may reflect an innate affec-
tive and inhibitory deficit (the low-anxious or ‘primary’ 
subtype), whereas in other cases psychopathy may arise 
as an indirect consequence of other temperament-related 
traits, most commonly involving excessive emotionality 
or neurotic anxiety (the high-anxious or ‘secondary’ 
subtype). (2011, 709)
This is an important difference because, as we will 
see, it undermines Zhong’s argument against the 
emotionist response. The emotionist response con-
tends that psychopaths fail to make genuine moral 
judgments because they lack moral emotions (Blair 
1995; Nichols 2004; Prinz 2008). Zhong lists sym-
pathy, guilt, and indignation as moral emotions, 
but his argument against emotionism (in contrast 
with the emotionism itself) places no emphasis on 
these specific emotions. Rather, his argument oper-
ates not only on a broad definition of psychopathy, 
but also a broad definition of emotion. His claim 
is that “emotion [unspecified] is not causally 
responsible for even normal people’s moral judg-
ment (although emotion may titrate the severity of 
moral judgment)” (Zhong 2013, 330). Specifically, 
he appeals to emotion deficits in general and to 
considerations of emotionally salient features in 
situations of moral dilemmas—the sidetrack (im-
personal) and the footbridge (personal) versions 
of the trolley problem.
In the footbridge case, the idea of pushing 
a person off the bridge onto the tracks to stop 
an oncoming trolley that would otherwise kill 
five other people generates negative emotions 
because the action involved would be up-close 
and personal compared with flipping a switch 
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to divert the trolley to a different track where it 
would kill only one other person (the sidetrack 
case). Utilitarian calculation should treat these 
two cases as equivalent, except that the up-close 
and personal nature of pushing the other person 
makes it emotionally repugnant. It is not entirely 
clear that the emotionality involved in the up-close 
and personal action is strictly moral in nature. The 
nature of the emotions that would be experienced 
in such cases is not usually specified in terms of 
guilt or sympathy, and Zhong does not specify 
what emotions might be involved. It could equally 
be a matter of emotions that pertain to the messy 
nature of the up-close and personal aspects of the 
action—actually pushing the person (and pos-
sibly receiving resistance and protest), having to 
listen to the other person’s scream which you just 
caused by your push, having to witness or at least 
think about the person’s decent and impact, not to 
mention the effects of the trolley—all because of 
your immediate action. Fear, disgust, and possibly 
empathy could be anticipated and could modulate 
your moral judgment. It is debatable whether fear, 
disgust, and empathy are necessarily or intrinsi-
cally moral emotions.
On the one hand, the lack of specification in 
regard to emotion in Zhong’s argument does not 
necessarily undermine his criticism of the emo-
tionist account; however, the specifics of the case 
he considers and the possible emotions that this 
case may generate are relevant to my later consid-
erations, so I will return to this point again. On 
the other hand, Zhong’s lack of specification with 
regard to type of psychopathy does undermine his 
argument. His argument against the emotionist 
view is based on an appeal to empirical evidence 
found in several recent studies. Because emotion-
ists contend that emotions play a causal role in 
the making of moral judgments, the emotionist 
prediction is that psychopaths, because of their 
emotional deficits, will make different moral judg-
ments than non-psychopaths. But this prediction is 
proved wrong in recent experiments. Psychopaths, 
Zhong contends, citing these experiments, make 
the same moral judgments as non-psychopaths; 
specifically, they regard killing in personal moral 
dilemmas, such as the footbridge case, as less 
permissible than killing in impersonal moral di-
lemmas, such as the sidetrack case. Zhong points 
to the experiments by Koenigs et al. (2011) as 
evidence. The study by Koenigs et al., however, 
entirely undermines Zhong’s argument against 
the emotionists. Koenigs et al. distinguish between 
low-anxious and high-anxious psychopathy and 
show that only high-anxious psychopaths make 
the same moral judgments as non-psychopaths 
in the personal moral dilemma cases. Recall that 
high-anxious or secondary psychopaths are not 
emotion-deficient, but commonly manifest “ex-
cessive emotionality” (Koenigs et al. 2011, 709). 
In contrast, low-anxious or primary psychopaths 
do have emotion deficits, and significantly they 
make different judgments than non-psychopaths 
in personal moral dilemma cases.
The low-anxious psychopaths endorsed a 
significantly greater proportion of the personal 
moral actions (M 1⁄4 0.58, s.d. 1⁄4 0.16) than did 
the non-psychopaths (M 1⁄4 0.46, s.d.1⁄40.15) 
(t1⁄42.3, P1⁄40.03), whereas the high-anxious 
psychopaths (M 1⁄4 0.49, s.d. 1⁄4 0.21) did not 
significantly differ from non-psychopaths in their 
personal moral judgment (t 1⁄4 0.5, P 1⁄4 0.60; 
Koenigs et al. 2011, 710). In effect, this study 
suggests that low-anxious psychopaths would 
have little trouble pushing another person off a 
footbridge to prevent a trolley from killing five 
others. Their emotional deficit apparently changes 
their moral judgment. Accordingly, the empirical 
evidence provided by the Koenigs et al. study sup-
ports the emotionist argument, in contrast with 
what Zhong claims.1
Phronesis and the Moral 
Frame Problem
Zhong’s argument motivates some concern 
about larger issues. Indeed, by suggesting that 
Zhong’s argument fails against emotionist ac-
counts, I do not mean to endorse emotionist or any 
other moral internalist accounts. Such accounts 
tend to ignore the significance of situated action 
and to focus on cognitive and emotional aspects 
considered as internal, mental processes. The ‘real 
action,’ for internalists, is in the head rather than 
in the world. In such approaches, the majority of 
discussion is focused on the making of the moral 
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judgment, accompanied by the significant assump-
tion that once the moral judgment is made the 
action follows. Subjects in the cited experiments 
are, of course, not on a footbridge standing next to 
a large person; they are in a lab, or in the case of 
the psychopaths, in a prison answering questions 
about an abstract situation. The experiments do 
not tell us much about how they would act in the 
real circumstance.
The emotionist discussion, as Zhong presents 
it, is about the causal influence or non-influence 
of emotion on moral judgment rather than moral 
action. Yet there are some equally important ques-
tions about the influence of emotion on action.2 In 
a particular situation, I may be motivated to save 
five people tied to the tracks and, if my emotions 
are in good order, I may easily form my moral 
judgment about flipping the switch that will lead to 
the death of one person, but as I actually move to 
flip the switch some other emotions may enter into 
play and I may fail to act in accord with my judg-
ment. This may seem more or less unlikely in the 
cold case of flipping the switch, but in many other 
cases of moral dilemma the action that is called for 
may involve a higher degree of emotional heat. If, 
because of psychopathic or utilitarian tendencies, 
my moral judgment is to push the other person 
off the footbridge, when push actually comes to 
shove that might not be an action I could perform 
precisely because of the up-close and personal 
interaction that is at stake, or the fear, disgust, or 
empathy that my action anticipates.
Noting these kinds of issues, I want to move 
the focus away from the internalist–cognitivist 
concern about forming or identifying the correct 
principle or rule, to a focus on the action situa-
tion and how the psychopath might perceive it. To 
shift the focus in this way is not to leave behind 
the question of how one comes to a moral judg-
ment; rather, it suggests a different approach to the 
same set of issues. It is a difference of where one 
starts—in the world rather than in the head—and 
it makes a difference in understanding the psycho-
path’s situation.
The internalist begins by asking what internal 
processes (cognitive or affective) cause a person 
to make a moral judgment. Once that important 
work of judging is complete, taking action is 
straightforward, with perhaps a slight compli-
cation introduced in terms of the will. Looking 
for the origins of a particular moral judgment, 
one might consider questions such as the follow-
ing: “How do people acquire, in the first place, 
the principle that personally harming another 
individual that will lead to a greater good is less 
permissible and more serious than impersonally 
harming another individual for a greater good?” 
(Zhong 2013, 334). This pushes the internalist 
question back quite a bit, but it nicely supports 
the internalist view if the answer involves an in-
nate origin, as Zhong prefers. Alternatively, one 
can take a developmentalist perspective and sug-
gest that children learn such principles through 
experience in social contexts. I doubt very much 
that either the nativist or the developmentalist ap-
proach is a good answer to this question, however, 
because I doubt that we do acquire these sorts of 
principles. Surely, any moral principles that we 
do acquire are much less complex than the one 
stated. A philosopher or psychologist might want 
to make the personal–impersonal distinction, but 
a moral agent is less likely to find this distinction 
in any principle he learns or inherits, although he 
could run into it in a particular situation. This is 
just the problem; whatever principles or rules we 
might have for moral conduct remain general, 
whereas each situation that we encounter is always 
particular.
This is, of course, the Aristotelian problem 
of phronesis or practical wisdom. Faced with a 
particular situation, we come to realize that our 
principles are not specific enough, or we come to 
realize that we do not have a principle that covers 
this particular context. Then we have to judge, not 
from a rule or principle, but from the situation. 
Our decision in such cases, although possibly still 
rational and affectively attuned, may in some sense 
be unprincipled. Such may be the case, in the case 
of an unusual moral dilemma, when our general 
principles fail us. Then we have to judge case by 
case rather than by principle. In such cases the per-
son with phronesis is said to be able to recognize, 
or even intuit, what ought to be done.
If Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics Book VI) is 
right, a person acquires phronesis, and this ability 
to judge, only by hanging around with the right 
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kind of people. Specifically, he suggests that we 
acquire phronesis only with the right upbringing 
and formation, surrounded by people who do 
the right thing, and by practicing such actions 
ourselves. Phronesis, Aristotle goes on to show, is 
not equivalent to cleverness—our cognitive abili-
ties may be perfectly attuned to making intelligent 
and clever decisions, but, as he puts it, a very 
clever criminal does not have phronesis because 
phronesis also depends on practicing the good. 
On this view, a clever person without phronesis 
would be able to make a moral judgment, to solve 
a moral puzzle, or to give the correct utilitarian 
response in an experiment—without following 
through with moral action. It is also possible that 
a person without phronesis would have a difficult 
time in making the right moral judgment in either 
the personal or impersonal case even if he knew the 
correct moral principle. Phronesis allows someone 
to recognize that this particular case is one that 
calls for the application of a particular principle. 
One may know the principle but without phronesis 
may not be able to recognize that this is a situation 
in which to apply that principle. In artificial intel-
ligence, this is referred to as the frame problem. 
Here we might call it the moral frame problem.
Such considerations suggest a different possible 
account of the psychopath’s amoral behavior. Even 
if the psychopath has memorized an appropriate 
moral principle, and if his cognitive faculties can 
lead him to make a moral judgment in some kind 
of abstract case (a trolley problem, for example), 
and even if such faculties are informed to some 
degree by affective processes, as in secondary 
psychopathy—even if all such internal processes 
are intact—in the heat of a real particular situa-
tion, the psychopath may fail to recognize what 
is morally salient and thus fail to recognize it as a 
situation where that principle or judgment applies. 
That is, the psychopath may suffer from the moral 
frame problem. The psychopath may be clever 
but lack phronesis, because of his upbringing and 
formation, or because some brain injury interferes 
with the way he perceives the particulars of a situ-
ation. This does not rule out complications of a 
cognitive or emotional nature, but it also does not 
reduce psychopathy to a mere internal (cognitive 
or affective) deficit.
Notes
1. Zhong also cites Glenn et al. (2009) to support his 
anti-emotionist argument. Glenn et al., however, unlike 
Koenigs et al., do not differentiate between primary and 
secondary psychopathy in their study. In a third study 
cited by Zhong, Cima, Tonnaer, and Hauser (2010) 
studied a group of psychopaths, all of whom showed 
flat emotional responses, but showed a similar pattern of 
judgments on moral dilemma tests as non-psychopaths. 
This study did not differentiate between primary and 
secondary psychopathy, however, and the authors also 
offered the following qualification: although psycho-
paths show emotional deficits, “other aspects of their 
emotions [e.g., recognition of basic emotions] may be 
relatively preserved, and these may be the most impor-
tant with respect to moral understanding. At present, 
however, this literature is unclear” (p. 65). Cima et al. 
(2010) also cite a large body of experimental literature 
that supports the emotionist interpretation.
2. Glenn et al. (2009) make a similar point.
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